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This paper uses experimental data to study the effects of participation in intensified 
placement efforts on subsequent job chances and earnings. Five small-scale experiments 
were performed in four different regions of Sweden in 2004 and the control groups were 
offered the PES regular services. Due to small samples, many of the impact estimates 
were imprecise and insignificant. However, the services generally reduced unemploy-
ment among the treated. I find significantly enhanced exits to either jobs or other acti-
vities (or both) in four of the experiments. Three of the experiments also report positive 
effects on employment probability and earnings in the years following the programme. 
Finally, combining job-search assistance and monitoring of job search generated signifi-
cantly better results than monitoring alone in one of the experiment locations. 
Keywords:  Active labour market policy evaluation, randomised social experiment, 
placement efforts 
JEL-codes: C93, J64 
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1  Introduction 
The 21st century has involved a somewhat new role for active placement efforts in 
Sweden. After the 90s crisis and the drastic increase of people with extensive periods of 
joblessness, these services have become more targeted towards subgroups of job seekers 
with a particular troublesome labour market situation, for example youth, immigrants, 
and long-term unemployed. The activities have also typically been integrated in 
different “guarantee” programmes, for example the “Youth guarantee” or the Job and 
Development programme, programmes in which coaching assistance and counseling 
constitutes the first among several steps attempting to get the unemployed employed. 
Earlier research has found active placement efforts to be both effective and inexpen-
sive in comparison to regular labour market programmes.
1
This paper reports the results from five experiments in four different regions of 
Sweden in 2004 where intensified placement activities were tested on exposed groups 
of unemployed. Participants and non-participants were selected through randomisation 
and the controls were assigned the PES regular services. I study the programme impact  
 And in contrast to the eva-
luations of the programmes, the findings are in many cases based on social experiments. 
In the United States, (Meyer, 1995, Ashenfelter et al., 2005, Klepinger et al., 2002, 
Black et al., 2003), and in Europe (Delander, 1978, Gorter & Kalb, 1996, Dolton & 
O’Neill, 1996, Van den Berg & Van der Klaauw, 2006, Graversen & Van Ours, 2008), 
job-search assistance, counselling and monitoring of job search, either separately or in 
combinations, are generally found to increase unemployment exits and enhance job 
chances. Since the positive effects - generally reported for both unemployed in general 
and for particularly exposed group - recurrently have been found early in the follow-up 
period, and sometimes even before programme start (see for instance Black et al., 
Dolton & O’Neill, and Graversen & Van Ours), the services seem to have a moti-
vational effect thus reducing the moral hazard problem embedded in the unemployment 
insurance system. 
                                                 
1 See for example Martin & Grubb (2001) and Kluve (2006) for overviews. 4  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
by comparing mean outcome differences in yearly gross earnings from work, employ-
ment status, and number of unemployed weeks, between 2004 and 2006. I also study 
unemployment duration and use hazard analysis to study the effect of the notification of 
the services, and the services themselves, separately. Finally I perform cost and benefit 
analyses to assess whether or not the tested services should be permanently adopted. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 describes the 
experiments and the data used to analyse them. Section 4-9 analyse the effects of the 
demonstrations, starting in section 4 with the mean differences in earnings, employment 
status and number of unemployment weeks between 2004 and 2006. Section 5 studies 
unemployment duration and the outflow from unemployment, section 6 the effect for 
different subgroups of unemployed, and section 7 performs sensitivity analyses. Section 
8 summarise the experiments in terms of cost and benefit, and section 9 looks more 
closely at the Jämtland results. Section 10, finally, sums up the findings. 
2  The experiments 
In 2004, the Swedish Labour Market Board (SLMB) funded several pilot schemes with 
the purpose of testing intensified placement efforts on exposed groups of unemployed in 
certain regions. The type of services pursued and the targeted subgroups to work with 
was decided on the region level. Participants and non-participants were selected through 
randomisation. The demonstrations were carried out alongside the employment offices´ 
regular services which means that non-participants received the same amount of ser-
vices that they otherwise would have. The demonstrations allowed unemployed both 
eligible and non-eligible for UI benefits. The experiment analyses, however, only in-
clude those who were UI eligible. The main reason is that the risk of sanction is exp-
ected to increase the job seekers willingness to participate. This paper reports the results 
from the experiments in the city of Skellefteå, and the counties of Jämtland, Uppsala, 
and Östergötland. 
2.1  The experimental set-up 
The design of the experiments was simple. From a defined target group, job ready job 
seekers registered at the employment offices were assigned either the demonstration IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  5 
services or the employment office’s regular services. Participation was mandatory and 
refusal to participate or to obey instructions from the case workers could cause re-
duction or withdrawal of the UI benefits.
2
2.2  The target groups 
 Enrolments of new participants were per-
formed between March and October of 2004 which creates variation in treatment among 
both treated and controls. Another source of treatment variation is that the services 
(except in Jämtland) were time-unlimited; the unemployed stayed in the programme 
until their situation was solved or until the programme ended in December of 2004. If 
participants left unemployment and then later returned, they were usually readmitted 
into the services. Finally, since the design of the experiments was determined region-
nally, the experiments lack a coherent evaluation strategy which makes the results diffi-
cult to generalise. On the other hand, more could potentially be learned from five small-
scale experiments testing similar services than from one large-scale experiment. Also, 
with social experiments still being very rare in this field in Sweden, they are still 
important contributions to the empirical literature. 
The services were typically restricted to currently registered as openly unemployed at 
the employment offices.
3  The randomisations thus involved stock based sampling.
4
Nationwide the labour market situation in 2003 and 2004 was difficult for youth. 
With the Swedish lay-off regulation - “last in first out” – youth was a particularly 
exposed group in lay-off situations.  Both the  Skellefteå and the  Östergötland demon- 
 
With the exception of Jämtland, the demonstrations were targeted towards regional-
specific difficult groups. Uppsala, largely characterised by its two universities and 
40 000 student, in 2003 held the largest proportion of high (post-upper secondary) 
educated among the unemployed (approximately 30 %). Accordingly, the demonstration 
services were targeted towards highly educated in social science, a particular exposed 
group. 
                                                 
2 Rejecting a programme referral violates the basic condition for UI compensation and leads to a 25 percent reduction 
in UI benefits for eight weeks, further refusals first generate a 50 percent cutback for an additional eight weeks and 
then a full withdrawal of benefits. 
3 An exception was made in Uppsala where a small number of part-time unemployed were admitted. 
4 The randomisation procedure is described in Appendix A. 6  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
stration targeted towards unemployed in the age group 18-24. Östergötland, however, 
almost exclusively focused on long-term unemployed youth entitled to UI benefits. 
Skellefteå made no such restrictions. 
Finally, the Jämtland demonstration was the least targeted one, only conditioning 
participation on UI entitlement. The motivation for the programme was the notably low 
search effort among the job seekers. For instance, according to the Job-seeker survey, a 
recurrent survey among unemployed at the employment offices, 31 per cent had not 
applied for a single job during June of 2003. The services thus involved all currently 
registered as openly unemployed and eligible for UI benefits. 
2.3  The regular services 
The control group, or the counterfactual, services consisted of the employment offices´ 
regular services. The controls could thus be offered both matching activities, similar to 
those offered the treated, and regular labour market programmes, like for instance a 
training programme. The services differed between the demonstrations both due to the 
targeted population and the local labour market situation. In Uppsala, the personnel 
situation was strained and the contact frequency after registering was usually set to 4-6 
months (youth excepted). In Jämtland, the follow-ups were set to six months. In the 
youth experiments in Östergötland and Skellefteå, and also among youth in Uppsala and 
Jämtland, the regular services involved more frequent contacts and meetings with the 
case workers. After 100 days, the youth were usually referred to the Youth Guarantee, a 
municipality full-time activation programme including various types of placement 
efforts, work practice and training schemes for a maximum of 12 months. Also, at the 
time, there was a large focus on unemployed youth since the government had set a goal 
to half the number of long-term unemployed youth between 2003 and 2004. This should 
have further reduced the average treatment dose difference between treated and non-
treated youth in the experiments. 
Whereas available register data unfortunately lack information on participation in 
placement and matching activities, participation in regular labour market programmes is 
continuously reported. It is not obvious that the treated would be less likely to parti-
cipate in programmes. The more frequent job seeker/case worker contacts could bring 
forward earlier unknown information about the unemployed thereby increasing the IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  7 
demand for, for instance, a training programme. Figure 1 a-d illustrates the usage of re-
gular programmes by reporting the share of treated and controls currently in a regular 
programme from the week of notification and the following two years. 
Overall, the share of regular programme participants increased during the first three 
months to either stabilise or decrease thereafter. Note that the shares do not adjust for 
unemployed leaving unemployment. Only small differences between treated and con-
trols are reported. Also, analysing unemployment-to-programme hazards, all experi-
ments but Uppsala report similar probabilities of being assigned a programme for 
treated and controls. In Uppsala the hazard is significantly higher in the treatment 
group. Hence, conditioned on still being unemployed after different durations, the 
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Figure 1 d Share of treated and controls in regular programmes, Skellefteå IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  9 
2.4  The demonstration services 
Although the initial idea was to test and find new alternative modes of placement 
services, the demonstration activities should rather be described as higher-quality deli-
very of already existing ones. Compared to the regular activities, the services were in-
tensified and involved more frequent contacts with the employment office case workers. 
The services were, however, not full-time activities. The activities consisted of four dis-
tinguishable activities: 
 
1  The first step was usually the same in all demonstrations; individual register 
information was checked and updated on issues such as recent educational 
achievements, job experience and occupation searched for. In some cases, the 
participants received increased surveillance in the data system, which meant that 
their qualification profiles were continuously matched against all job openings. 
Positive matches resulted in job suggestions or job referrals.
5
2  The placement efforts consisted of counselling and of job-search assistance 
services which typically involved activities like learning about different job-
search strategies, self assessment, preparing resumes, completing job applica-
tions, and also learning skills in how to best manage the different self-service 
instrument available at the PES. The activities were usually pursued in weekly or 
monthly group meetings. 
 
3  Besides skill-enhancing activities, monitoring of job search and stricter 
enforcement of the UI eligibility rules was also emphasised in the demonstra-
tions. These services consisted of both follow-ups on the job-search efforts, 
performed as integrated parts of the job-search activity meetings, and employer 
contacts and follow-ups of the job referrals sent out to the unemployed. 
4  Finally, all demonstrations had access to all regular labour market programmes 
if that was thought necessary. This possibility was especially pronounced in 
Uppsala and Östergötland. The idea was however to rely as much as possible on 
the active placement efforts. 10  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
The services in Uppsala consisted of recurrent non-supervised job-search meetings in 
groups of 8-10 job seekers. The treated were continuously presented with questions of 
problem-solving character to discuss at the meetings. They also reviewed each others 
CVs and practiced on job-interview situations. From initially meeting 2-3 hours two 
times a week, the groups later met only once a week. 
Both the Skellefteå and Östergötland demonstration involved traditional job-search 
assistance activities. Östergötland emphasised skills in managing the self-service Inter-
net applications available at the PES. The activities were arranged as group meetings 
once a week and the participants were assigned homework between every meeting. In 
Skellefteå, well documented job-search methods were applied. The participants initially 
met once a week in groups and then later once a month to follow up the job-search 
efforts. 
The treatment group in Jämtland was randomly divided into two groups. The first 
group, the JSA+M group, received both assisted job search and monitoring of the job-
search efforts. The activities were arranged in monthly group meetings. The other 
group, the M-group, was only subject to the monitoring treatment which was arranged 
as monthly in-person meetings. The design enables the effect from being referred to the 
combined activities and monitoring alone to be derived separately. The activities in 
Jämtland were time limited. After three months the participants were referred to the 
regular activities at the employment office if their situation had not yet been resolved. 
Figure 2 and Table 1 (below) sums up the experiments. 
                                                                                                                                               
5 As opposed to job suggestions, job referrals are legally binding. If the unemployed omits to apply for a job referred 
to by the case worker, unemployment compensation could be reduced. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  11 
 
Figure 2 Duration timeline for the demonstration services 
2.5  Compliance and pre-programme exits 
The ideal experiment keeps a 100 percent difference in treatment between experiment 
and control group. This way the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) corre-
sponds to the simple mean difference in outcome between the groups. This ideal situa-
tion is however very rare in field experiments and the occurrence of no-shows, drop-
outs, and cross-overs often dilute the experiment. The conceptual advance of the social 
experiment is then reduced. As shown in for example Heckman et al. (1999), the share 
of participants in the treatment group is often less than 0.7, and sometimes less than 0.5. 
Also, in some experiments as much as 40 percent of the controls receive substitute 
services. 
All experiments presented in this paper suffer from no-shows, i.e. experiment group 
members not showing up for the experimental treatment. These no-shows stems from 
unemployed registered as job ready but in fact awaiting participation in a labour market 
programme. In these situations, the labour market programme was generally prioritised 
over the demonstration activities. To reduce the risk of multiple referrals, all demon-
strations except Skellefteå agreed upon reviewing all individual acts before randomi-
sation. This way, unemployed with other active measures about to start could be elimi-
nated from the sample. This elimination procedure substantially reduced the number of 
inactive experiment group members and thus increased the average treatment dose. 
Besides no-shows, several experiment group members found other employment in 
the period between referral to, and start of, the demonstration services. Since the referral 
itself could alter the job-search behaviour and cause systematic differences in  the 
Notification-
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and start of 
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End of the 
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experiment and control group composition, we need to keep these non-active treatment 
group members in the analyses in order to maintain the advantage of the randomisation. 
The share of pre-programme exits in each experiment to a large extent depends on the 
length of the pre-programme period.
6
In addition, since the controls were offered the regular services, some of them 
received similar services as the treated. In sum, the difference in the fraction of treated 
and controls is well below 1. The mean-difference estimator does thus not represent the 
ATET but rather the “intent-to-treat” impact of intensified services. 
 In Östergötland and Uppsala, using a three and a 
4.4-week interval between notification and programme start, 40 and 44 percent 
respectively left open unemployment before start. In Jämtland, using an average 6.3-
week pre-programme period, the share was 57 percent. In Skellefteå where we lack 
information on the length of the pre-programme period, 12 percent left within a week. 
On the other hand, between 15 (18) and 25 (34) percent among those who left returned 
to unemployment within 1 (2) week(s), and the vast majority was reassigned to the 
demonstration services. A crude estimation would suggest that between 60 and 75 
percent of the treatment groups visited the programmes at least once. 
                                                 
6 The share also depends on the mobility of the targeted population. Also, in Jämtland, the share was correlated with 
randomisation outcome (treated/control). IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  13 
 
Table 1 The demonstration programmes: an overview 
  Jämtland  Uppsala  Östergötland  Skellefteå 
Target group  Openly 
unemployed 
Openly unem-































1003  518  735  288 
Whereof:         
Treated  496  275  357  143 
Controls   507         243            378           145 
 
3  Data and empirical strategy 
3.1  Data 
The unemployment periods were followed in A-stat, a register data base containing 
information on UI payments, benefit type and benefit levels administered by the UI 
funds. Since A-stat  lacks information about exit cause, data are combined with the 
unemployment register data at the time of exit. Since these two registers do not fully 
match, exits lacking a corresponding exit cause within two weeks are categorised as 
exits to “cause unknown”. I have access to A-statdata until December 31 2006 and 
unemployment register data until August 2008. 
I use the LISA-register, administered by Statistics Sweden, to find information about 
employment status in November each year and also yearly gross earnings from work. 
LISA also contains vast individual information. 
Table  2  describes the experiment and control groups. The randomisations were 
successful in such that the groups are similar in general. In Jämtland, however, the 14  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
group receiving only the monitoring services has a significantly less extensive 
unemployment history than the control group.
7
                                                 
7 Note, however, that the experiment and control groups are expected to differ significantly in some aspects (0.05 • 
the no. of covariates). 
  The overall extensive periods of 
unemployment, both in ongoing and previous spells, at least partly reflects the poor 
labour market in the region. Being the least targeted experiment, Jämtland has repre-
senttation in all age and educational categories.  The Uppsala participants also have 
experience from extensive periods of unemployment on average. The share of women is 
also the highest among the experiments. The experimental groups in the youth experi-
ments (Östergötland and Skellefteå) are very similar in most aspects. By definition, both 
the age average and the share of highly educated are low. However, since Östergötland 
almost exclusively focused on long-term unemployed, the participants have longer 
spells of unemployment, both in the current and past periods.  
Table 2 summary statistics for treated and controls, proportions if not otherwise stated (standard deviations within parentheses) 
  Jämtland  Uppsala  Östergötland  Skellefteå 
  Treated            
(JSA+M)    
Treated             
(M)  
Controls          Treated       Controls         Treated      Controls       Treated  Controls 
  Female  0.32 (0.47)  0.35 (0.48)  0.28 (0.45)  0.53 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50)  0.44 (0.50)  0.38 (0.49)  0.34 (0.47)  0.32 (0.47) 
Age                   
  18-24  0.07 (0.26)  0.08 (0.28)  0.07 (0.25)  0.01 (0.12)  0.01 (0.11)  0.91 (0.29)  0.92 (0.27)  0.92 (0.27)  0.92 (0.28) 
  25-44  0.57 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50)  0.56 (0.50)  0.73 (0.44)  0.70 (0.46)  0.09 (0.29)  0.08 (0.27)  0.08 (0.27)  0.08 (0.28) 
  45-  0.35 (0.48)  0.41 (0.49)  0.37 (0.48)  0.25 (0.43)  0.29 (0.46)  -  -  -  - 
Educational level                   
  <=Compuls. school  0.19 (0.39)  0.25 (0.43)  0.21 (0.41)  -  -  0.09 (0.29)  0.13 (0.34)  0.08 (0.28)  0.10 (0.30) 
  Upper secondary  0.54 (0.50)  0.49 (0.50)  0.54 (0.50)  -  -  0.83 (0.37)  0.78 (0.41)  0.87 (0.33)  0.83 (0.38) 
  University   0.27 (0.44)  0.26 (0.44)  0.25 (0.43)  1.0 (0.06)  1.0 (0.00)  0.08 (0.26)  0.09 (0.28)  0.04 (0.20)  0.08 (0.27) 
Unempl. history
*                   
  Years in ong. spell  0.92 (1,57)  0.88 (1.62)  0.88 (1.54)  0.60 (0.89)  0.66 (0.76)  0.56 (0.66)  0.55 (0.61)  0.13 (0.16)  0.15 (0.24) 
  Years in all spells  3.51 (4,62)  2.65 (4.10)  3.09 (4.02)  2.16 (2.34)  2.06 (2.09)  1.05 (0.78)  1.07 (0.83)  0.78 (1.22)  0.67 (1.10) 
Daily compensation   624 (116)  618 (126)  626 (117)  589 (166)  569 (171)  486 (161)  481 (160)  464 (157)  479 (154) 
 Number of obs.  246  250  507  275  243  357  378  143  145 
Notes: Data are based on information from the week of notification.
*Includes periods of open unemployment and programme participation. Bold type indicates deviation from the 
control group at the significance level 5% 16  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
3.2  Empirical strategy 
Treated and controls are followed between notification of the demonstration services in 
2004 until December 31 2006 in three of dimensions analysed; yearly gross earnings, 
employment probability, and number of unemployment weeks. Analysing unemploy-
ment duration, spells could be followed beyond 2006 had the unemployed entered a 
regular labour market programme before December 31 2006.
8
First I use a linear regression model and a logistic model to adjust for random differ-
ences in observables comparing the outcomes in yearly gross earnings from work, em-
ployment probability and number of unemployment weeks. Analysing earnings and 
number of unemployment weeks, I use the following model: 
 
 
i i T i i Y e + + = λ γ ' X ,        (1) 
 
where i Y is gross earnings or number of unemployment weeks each year between 2004 
and 2006. X  is a covariate vector with individual information collected from the 
available registers, and  g  it’s corresponding parameter vector.
9
i T   is a dummy variable 
taking the value one if the person is treated and zero otherwise, and l is the coefficient. 
Analysing the binary outcome of employment status,  i Y , in November each year I 
use the logit specification: 
 
i i T i
*
i Y e + + = λ γ ' X ,        (2) 
 
where  i Y  for the ith individual is 1 if  *
i Y >0, and 0 otherwise. 
Second, to discriminate between exits during the pre-programme and programme 
period I use a Cox proportional-hazard model with time-dependent covariates. Analy-
sing the effect from being assigned the services and the services themselves separately, I 
use the following model: 
                                                 
8 Did the unemployed enter another period of open unemployment after participation in a regular labour market 
programme, the unemployed was followed in the unemployment register and not in the unemployment payment 
register (A-stat). 
9 Analysing each experiment, I control for gender, age, educational level, citizenship, working disability, measures of 
unemployment history, occupation searched for, education and experience in the occupation searched for, UI benefit 
type, UI benefit level, local labour market office, and demonstration start date. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  17 
(t)λ ' i Z γ ' i X + + a = ) t ( ) t ( i θ log       (3) 
 
where  ) θ(t  is the off-unemployment hazard at t.  ) t ( a  is the log baseline hazard function 
and  g   is a coefficient vector corresponding to the variable vector x,  that includes 
personal characteristics. Investigating time-specific effects, the vector  ) t ( Z  includes a 
dummy separating the pre-programme and programme period, and interaction terms 
capturing the impact of being a treatment group member in each of these periods 
respectively.l is the corresponding parameter vector. 
Analysing the impact of the services on job and “other” exits separately, I use the 
same specification as in equation 3 but without ) t ( Z . Also,  ) (t i θ  is replaced by  ) t ( ij q , 
which is the conditional density of leaving unemployment to destination j at time t, 
given that unemployment was still in progress at t-1. Conditioned on the specified 
destinations (jobs and other activities) being mutually exclusive and jointly exhausting 
of all possible destinations, the marginal hazard function is the sum of all the state-







). t ( j ) t (         (4) 
 
The estimation of each state-specific hazard rate is performed separately by right 
censoring all other exits. 
4  Mean differences 
Table 3 reports the effect from the demonstration services on subsequent yearly gross 
earnings from work and job status at November 1, and also  the number of unem-
ployment weeks, between 2004 and 2006.
10
The effects in Jämtland are somewhat mixed in the sense that the results of the 
JSA+M and the M-services differ. With one exception, members of both experiment 
 
                                                 
10 A few observations are lost in each experiment analysing gross earnings and job chances. This is due to people 
either having deceased or moved abroad. We assume that either of the occurrences is uncorrelated with being a 
 18  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
groups are unemployed 0.6-2 weeks less on average each year. However, while the 
JSA+M activities throughout report positive effects on both job probability and gross 
earnings, the effects of the M-services are often close to zero and sometimes negative. 
Comparing the outcome of the two treatment groups, the difference in earnings in 2006, 
and in job chances in 2005 and 2006, is significant positive in favour of the combined 
services.
11
The results of the Uppsala demonstration are overall positive and in 2005, all out-
come measures are significantly positive. The probability of being employed was 53 per 
cent higher and yearly earnings on average SEK 19,200 (approximately €1,920) higher. 
In 2006, the earnings difference is somewhat higher while the job-status difference has 
dropped to 18 percent. 
 
In Östergötland, the outcome differences are throughout small and insignificant. All 
impact estimators are more positive in 2006 than in 2004. Finally, in the other youth 
experiment in Skellefteå, the results are quite positive with large, positive and signi-
ficant effects on either job chances or earnings (or both) in all of the years. The very 
positive effects are somewhat surprising considering the overall large focus on youth 
during this period. 
In conclusion, the services generally seem to have reduced unemployment among the 
treated although the effects in most cases are insignificant. Despite imprecise impact 
estimates, I also find significantly positive effects on either job chances or yearly gross 
earnings (or both), in three of the experiments. Finally, Jämtland reports better job 
chances and higher earnings from combining JSA activities and increased monitoring 
than from increased monitoring alone. 
                                                                                                                                               
treatment  or a control group member.  The  follow-up period in 2004 (1 November) was on average 128 days 
(Skellefteå), 147 (Östergötland), 180 (Jämtland), and 182 (Uppsala). 
11 Using log income does not change any of the conclusions in this section. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  19 
 
Table 3 Adjusted impact estimates on yearly gross earnings from work (SEK 1000), 
employment status (odds ratios), and number of unemployment weeks 2004-2006 
  Jämtland 
  JSA+M  M 










# of u.e 
weeks 




-0.6     
[-2.3-1.0] 










-1.7        
[-4.3-0.9] 




-2.0            
[-4.6-0.6] 










1.7              
[-0.9-4.3] 
  Uppsala  Östergötland 










# of u.e 
weeks 
2004  2.0      
[-12.7-16.7] 
1.25    
[0.84-1.85] 






-0.7   
[-2.1-0.7]        










0.1   
[-2.4-2.6]           








1.11    
[-0.79-1.55] 
0.5  
[-1.8-2.9]             
  Skellefteå   




# of u.e 
weeks 
     
2004  18.4***   
[5.6-31.1] 
1.44   
[0.85-2.45] 
-2.2* 
[-4.5-0.1]            
     





[-6.2-0.7]           
     




-0.5   
[-3.8-2.8]          
     
Notes: No. of obs. analysing gross earnings and job status, Jämtland (JSA+M), 2004: 753, 2005: 749, 2006: 745. 
Jämtland (M), 2004: 753, 2005: 753, 2006: 750. Uppsala, 2004: 511, 2005: 504, 2006: 500. Östergötland, 2004: 735, 
2005: 732, 2006: 729. Skellefteå, 2004: 288, 2005: 288, 2006: 286. No. of obs. analysing # of unemployment weeks, see 
Table 1. I control for gender, age, educational level, citizenship, working disability, measures of unemployment history, 
occupation searched for, education and experience in the occupation searched for, UI benefit type, UI benefit level, local 
labour market office,  and start date.  95%-confidence intervals are within square brackets. *, **, *** refer to significance 
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 20  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
5  Unemployment duration analysis 
The reduced risk of unemployment found in the previous section could either be due to 
the services speeding up the exits, or due to a reduced risk of recurrent unemployment. 
This section presents programme impacts both as mean differences in unemployment 
duration, and as differences in hazard rates. Unemployment includes both periods of 
open unemployment and participation in regular labour market programmes.
12 I follow 
the unemployed between the week of notification until either interruption of the UI (or 
the regular labour market programme) spell or until December 31 2006.
13
5.1  Mean difference in unemployment duration 
 A 0.5-day 
interruption of the UI spell and a 1-day interruption of the programme spell is enough to 
end the unemployment spell. In section 5.4, I also report the effect from using a one-
week interruption rule instead. In the hazard analyses, transitions are split between exits 
before (pre-programme) and after (participation) entry into the programme (5.2). Also, 
exits to different states are analysed separately (5.3). 
Table  4  reports programme effects as adjusted mean-differences in unemployment 
duration. Note that since all spells but two (!) had ended before December 31 1996, 
almost no observations are censored.
14
Participation in the demonstrations usually speeds up the exits from unemployment. 
All experiments report shorter unemployment spells among the treated. However, only 
the results from Jämtland are statistically significant. Both services shortened unem-
ployment duration by almost seven weeks, or 32 percent. Considerably smaller but still 




                                                 
12 As openly unemployed the job seekers receive UI benefits, as regular labour market participants the unemployed 
instead receive activity support. The compensation level is the same in both states. 
 
13 If the unemployed were currently in a regular labour market programme at December 31 2006, I could follow the 
unemployment spell until August 2008. 
14 One observation each in Uppsala and Skellefteå was still in progress at December 31 2006. They are included 
analysing both the impact on mean differences and the hazard rates. They are censored in the hazard analyses. 
15 The average unemployment spells among the controls were 22.0 weeks (Jämtland), 22.4 weeks (Uppsala), 20.4 
weeks (Östergötland), and 12.0 weeks (Skellefteå). IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  21 
Table 4 Adjusted impact estimates on unemployment durations (weeks) 
Demonstration  Impact estimate  
Jämtland   
     JSA+M       -6.9 [-11.7- -2.1]*** 
     M       -6.8 [-11.5- -2.2]*** 
Uppsala       -0.4 [-5.6-4.8] 
Östergötland       -1.1 [-5.6-3.3] 
Skellefteå       -2.2 [-5.9-1.5] 
Notes: Adjustments are made in a linear regression model including the covariates 
specified in Table 3. 95%-confidence intervals are within square brackets. *, **, *** 
refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
5.2  Time-varying effects 
In Table 5, the dynamics of the treatment effects are studied separating the effect from 
receiving notice of the services, and the services themselves. The first row reports the 
average effect over the follow-up period. 
In Jämtland, both service packages expectedly report positive and significant effects. 
The JSA+M services increased the hazard by 37 percent and the monitoring services by 
30 percent. However, the dynamics of the effects differ somewhat. Whereas the JSA+M 
services generate large off-unemployment exits before start, and  smaller but still 
positive effects during the programme, the impact from the monitoring services is the 
opposite. Remember that the JSA+M services were performed in groups, whereas the 
monitoring services were performed in person. The group meetings may have appeared 
stigmatizing for some unemployed, which could have generated the large pre-
programme exits. Also, with a relatively worse group of unemployed remaining at pro-
gramme start, the programme effect could be downward biased due to compositional 
effects not captured by the model. However, the estimated average impacts do not 
significantly differ between the two treatment packages. 
Both the Uppsala and Östergötland services report positive but insignificant effects 
on the average hazard ratio. Both demonstrations also show larger programme than pre-
programme impacts. In Skellefteå, where no separation between pre-programme and 
programme effect is possible, the effect on the average hazard ratio is large (27 %), 
positive and significant. 22  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
An interesting fact is that the demonstrations (Jämtland) generating the most positive 
programme effects also generated the most positive pre-programme effects. This could 
be interpreted as the programmes having a deterrent impact on some unemployed and a 
job-seeking skill-enhancing impact on others. This scenario would be expected to be 
especially common in situations where the assigned programme was both ambitious and 
time-consuming. The Jämtland demonstrations, however, were the least intense 
programmes of the five tested with meetings only every 3-4 week instead of every one 
week or 1-2 weeks. With the motivation for the Jämtland demonstration being the low 
job-search effort level among the job seekers, a possible explanation for the results is 
that the services interfered with other, perhaps income bringing, activities. The services 
had then a deterrent impact both during the pre-programme and the programme period. 
Table 5 Adjusted programme, pre-programme, and participation impacts on 
the hazard ratio 
  Jämtland 
  JSA+M  M 
Average programme effect       1.372 (0.084)***      1.299 (0.084)*** 
    Pre-programme effect      1.515 (0.115)***  1.203 (0.121) 
Participation effect   1.238 (0.118)*      1.386 (0.111)*** 
  Uppsala  Östergötland 
Average programme effect  1.056 (0.093)  1.074 (0.078) 
    Pre-programme effect  1.004 (0.191)  1.034 (0.145) 
Participation effect  1.072 (0.105)  1.090 (0.091) 
  Skellefteå   
Average programme effect     1.271 (0.123)**   
    Pre-programme effect  -   
Participation effect  -   
Notes: Estimations include the covariates specified in Table 3. Standard errors are within parentheses. *, **, *** 
refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
5.3  Exit to different states 
Higher exits from unemployment are not equivalent to societal benefits. Making unem-
ployment more inconvenient could deter some job seekers to other related transfer 
systems and thus postpone employment transitions. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  23 
Table  6  reports the impact on the hazard ratio for transitions to jobs and “other” 
activities separately. The small sample sizes make it necessary to jointly examine the 
exits to cause unknown, sickness absence, early retirement and regular training. Stu-
dying state-specific exits, the analyses are sensitive to the quality of the local register 
routines. Worse register routines generate higher shares of exits to cause unknown. 
In Jämtland, both treatment packages generated significantly higher exits both to jobs 
and “other” activities. The exits rose between 30 and 44 percent. Among the “other” 
exits, transitions to the sickness insurance system due to sickness absence were parti-
cularly pronounced. Behind the small positive effect on the average hazard ratio re-
ported in Table 5, the Uppsala services significantly enhanced the job exit rate while the 
“other” exits were significantly reduced. This result corresponds with the positive 
effects found on both employment status and yearly earnings in the years following the 
demonstration (Table  3). Finally, in the youth experiments, Östergötland reports 
positive but insignificant hazard ratio estimates both to jobs and other exits, while the 
Skellefteå experiment reports a large, positive and significant effect on the job exit rate. 
Both results are in agreement with the above findings analysing job status and earnings. 
Table 6 Adjusted impact estimates on the hazard ratio to jobs and other activities 
  Job  Other 
Jämtland     
     JSA+M  1.322 (0.121)**  1.440 (0.117)** 
     M  1.300 (0.122)**  1.306 (0.116)** 
Uppsala  1.925 (0.153)***  0.724 (0.121)*** 
Östergötland  1.101 (0.112)  1.037 (0.111) 
Skellefteå  1.848 (0.197)***  1.005 (0.165) 
Notes: Estimations control for the covariates specified in Table 3. “Other” activities refer to exits to 
cause unknown, sickness absence, early retirement and regular training. Standard errors are within 
parentheses. *, **, *** refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
5.4  Using a one-week interruption rule 
Alternating the required length of the unemployment interruption spell could shed 
further light as to the nature of the unemployment exits. A consequence of instead using 
a one-week interruption rule is that the share of unknown exits is significantly reduced. 24  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
This since many of the very temporary interruptions is not registered in the unemploy-
ment register. 
In Appendix B (Table B 1-Table B 3), the results from the duration analyses in Table 
4-Table  6  are presented using a one-week interruption rule instead. In Table B 1, 
analysing adjusted mean differences in unemployment duration, the Uppsala and the 
youth experiments perform similarly as in the main analysis where more temporary 
interruptions were allowed to end the UI spells. However, the very significant 
reductions of the UI spells in Jämtland are reduced from almost seven to 4.2 and 4.6 
weeks. These are still substantial impacts but no longer significant. 
Continuing with the hazard analyses, Uppsala and the youth experiments report 
almost exactly the same average hazard ratio impact estimates as in the main analysis 
(Table B 2). However, both Östergötland and Uppsala report substantially larger pre-
programme estimates and somewhat smaller programme effects. Also, both Uppsala 
and Skellefteå present smaller, although still significant, impact estimates on the job 
transitions (Table B 3). 
Not allowing within-week interruptions alters the hazards in Jämtland quite a bit. 
Similar to the mean-difference outcomes the average hazard ratios are negatively 
affected. In fact, only the combined-service impact estimate (reduced from 37 to 22 
percent) is still significant. While the JSA+M services report considerably lower pre-
programme effects (no longer significant), and a similar participation effect, the 
monitoring services now have a negative impact during the pre-programme period and a 
somewhat smaller (19 %) but still significant participation effect. Interesting as well is 
that while the large, positive and significant positive effect on job exits still remains, the 
transitions to other destinations, and particularly to sickness absence, has now 
disappeared. One can thus conclude that the significantly enhanced exit rates before 
programme start found in the main analyses were due to unemployed reporting 
temporary sick. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  25 
6  Group-specific impacts 
Average effects are likely to conceal heterogeneity between individuals and groups of 
unemployed. This section analyses differences in pay-off between subgroups of unem-
ployed by pooling data from all experiments and all years. I adjust for any composi-
tional differences in background factors and also include dummies for each demon-
stration. 
Summing the results from the experiments and over the entire follow-up period, three 
out of four outcome measures report positive and significant impact estimates. On 
average, the demonstration services increased gross earnings with SEK 15 500 (appro-
ximately € 155), reduced unemployment duration with three weeks and the total number 
of unemployment weeks with 2.3 weeks, during the 2-3 year long follow-up period. 
Men significantly enhance their exit rate from unemployment, whereas women in-
crease their gross earnings more than women. Interesting to note is that youth do not 
seem to gain from the services despite the very positive effects from Skellefteå. The 
oldest age category, 45-, report the most positive effects with the highest increase in 
gross earnings and with large and significant reductions in both unemployment duration 
(-7.4 weeks), and in total unemployment (-7.2 weeks). Analysing the effects on edu-
cational level, the results are somewhat mixed with significantly positive effects among 
both the lowest, -8.0 weeks in unemployment duration, and the highest, SEK 36 000 in 
gross earnings and -5.2 weeks in total unemployment, educated. Finally, the services 
seem to be equally favourable for both short-term and long-term unemployed. If any-
thing, long-term unemployed seem to benefit more, at least in terms of reducing the risk 
of current and future unemployment. 26  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
 
Table 7 Adjusted group-specific impacts on gross earnings (SEK 1000) and num-
ber of unemployment weeks (both aggregated 2004–2006), employment proba-
bility 2006 (odds ratio) and unemployment duration (weeks). Pooled data. 
 
 
Gross             
earnings 
Employment      
status, 2006 




Average effect  15.5*     
(9.1) 
1.10    
(0.09) 
-2.3*      
(1.3) 
-3.0***    
 (1.1) 
Gender:            
 Men     14.3    
(12.3) 
1.06     
(0.12) 
-2.5        
(1.7) 
-3.5**          
(1.5) 
 Women  20.3    
(12.8) 
1.15    
(0.15) 
-1.3       
(2.0) 
-1.6             
(1.8) 
Age:                 
 18-24              5.1      
(11.4) 
1.05    
(0.14) 
0.8        
(2.1) 
0.2              
(1.7) 
 25-44  20.7    
(15.7) 
1.21    
(0.17) 
-3.3*      
(2.0) 
-3.7**          
(1.5) 
 45-64  34.8    
(24.3) 
0.94    
(0.20) 
-7.2**    
(3.4) 
-7.4**         
 (3.5)    
Education:          
 Compulsory  9.8        
(23.2) 
1.18        
(0.27) 
-4.2       
(4.3) 
-8.0**         
 (3.5) 
 Upper secondary  1.2          
(10.7) 
1.03     
(0.12) 
0.5        
(1.8) 
-2.4             
(1.5) 
 University  36.7**       
(19.1) 
1.25       
(0.18) 
-5.2**        
(2.3) 
-1.6              
(2.0) 
Previous u.e  
(total).          
  <=3 months  24.5*        
(14.9) 
1.11       
(0.17) 
-1.2        
(2.1) 
-1.4              
(1.7) 
  >3<=12 months  13.3         
(14.0) 
1.05       
(0.14) 
-1.9       
(2.0) 
-2.4             
(1.7) 
  >12 months  8.9         
(20.3) 
1.23       
(0.22) 
-5.2       
(3.4) 
-6.5**         
 (3.2) 
Notes: No. of obs, gross earnings: 2,504, employment status: 2,507, # of unemployment weeks and unemployment 
duration: 2,544. Estimations control for the covariates specified in Table 3. Standard errors are within parentheses. 
*, **, *** refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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7  Sensitivity analysis 
With the treated and controls being treated side by side, there are several ways in which 
their respective performance could have affected each other. For example, the treated 
could have enhanced their job chances at the expense of reduced job chances among the 
controls. Also, the employment offices could have recruited their most  experienced 
administrators for the demonstration services and replaced them with less experienced 
personnel to perform the regular services. Under both these circumstances, the benefits 
of the demonstration services would be exaggerated. On the other hand, if the demon-
stration activities to some extent were copied by the administrators of the control 
groups, or inspired them to compete with the treatment groups, this would underesti-
mate the true impact estimates. 
A common way of testing whether or not the treatment effects are biased is to use 
non-experimental methods to compare the performance of the control group to some 
relevant comparison. Since identifying the experimental groups, with the exception of 
Skellefteå, involved a thorough review of the individual acts – and a similar procedure 
is not possible here – relevant comparison groups cannot be attained using available 
register data. Therefore, I use data to make excess selections of control group members 
who, in the absence of the individual-act review, would also have been included in the 





 reports the difference-in-difference estimates comparing unemployment du-
ration in 2003 and 2004 between the constructed control groups and, i) unemployed in 
the region (county) closest comparing durations in 2003, and ii) among unemployed in 
all regions.
17
                                                 
16 The share of “true controls”, i.e. unemployed part of the actual control group, was 26.1 percent in Uppsala, 13.9 
percent in Östergötland, and 10.6 percent in Jämtland. In Skellefteå, no excess population was necessary.  
 None of the impact estimates is significant I thus find no evidence of the 
treatment effects being either upward or downward biased. The point estimates are more 
precise and closer to zero making comparisons with the outcome of all regions, 
compared to the closest region. Also, whereas the estimates of the non-youth experi-
17 The region performing most similar to Jämtland in 2003 was the county of Västerbotten. Stockholm, Västmanland, 
and Norrbotten constitute counterfactuals to Uppsala, Östergötland and Skellefteå respectively. 28  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
ments indicates negative spill-over effects and thus overestimated treatment impacts, the 
estimates of the youth experiments signals the opposite. 
Table 8 difference-in-difference regression estimates comparing unem-
ployment duration between "controls" and their counterparts in the region 
performing closest in 2003, and all regions, weeks 
  Region closest in 2003
a  All regions
b 
Jämtland  -0.86 (0.62)  -0.26 (0.57) 
Uppsala  -0.32 (1.51)  -0.15 (1.32) 
Östergötland   1.30 (1.06)   0.37 (0.58) 
Skellefteå   2.15 (2.15)   0.57 (1.94) 
Notes: No. of observations, Jämtland: 
a: 24,737, 
b: 507,033. Uppsala: 
a: 8,480, 
b: 39,521. Östergötland: 
a: 7,791, 
b: 88,467. Skellefteå: 
a: 3,385, 
b: 58,112. Standard errors are within parentheses. *, **, *** refer  to significance 
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
8  Cost-and-benefit analysis 
This section analyses the cost and benefits of the programmes on different levels of 
society to assess whether or not the tested services should be permanently adopted. 
Following Meyer (1995), I study the costs and benefits using the perspectives, i) the UI 
system, ii) government as a whole, and iii) society. Analysing the impact on the UI 
system, the administrative costs of performing the demonstrations are contrasted against 
the benefits adding the changes in UI payments over the three year follow-up period.
18 
Adding the tax revenues of any earnings increases, I get the perspective of the 
government.
19
Although the administrative costs were low (SEK 2-3,000/person on average), the 
Östergötland demonstration generated small but negative savings in the UI system. 
Östergötland also generated negative effects on the society level where the effect on 
earnings also are taken into account. Interesting to note is the Jämtland (M) results 
 The societal perspective compares the earnings changes with the admini-
strative costs of the experiments. Obviously, with the experiments being small-scale, I 
say nothing about the general equilibrium effects the services potentially would produce 
fully implemented. 
                                                 
18 The outcome differences have been adjusted for in regression models including observables. Comparing earnings, a 
few observations are lost due to missing observations in the LISA register. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  29 
where the positive change in the UI benefit system is greater than the change in earnings 
producing a larger surplus in the UI system than for society. The results correspond with 
the mixed effects found on the unemployment exit rate (positive) and subsequent 
earnings (negative). 
Finally, Jämtland (JSA+M), Uppsala, and Skellefteå all report large benefits on the 
UI and on the society level. However, only the effects of the Uppsala (UI benefits) and 
Skellefteå (earnings) services are significant adding all years. 
                                                                                                                                               
19 The tax revenues correspond to tax on earnings (30%), and employer taxes (30%).  
Table 9 Analyses of cost and benefits of the demonstrations (SEK 1000, approximately € 100) 
        Benefits minus costs 






UI system                            
(1)+(2) 
All government*  
(4)+.6•(3) 
Society       
(3)-(2) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Jämtland             
     JSA+M  10.0  -2.0  22.5  8.1  22.1  20.5 
     M  4.3  -2.0  2.1  2.3  3.6   0.1 
Uppsala  18.6  -2.2  40.2  16.4  41.4  38.0 
Östergötland  -0.0  -1.9  -0.0  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0 
Skellefteå  12.9  -2.6  52.4  10.4  53.0  65.8 
Note: *: 0.6 refers to adding earnings taxes (30 %) and employer fee (30 %). IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  31 
9  JSA and monitoring versus monitoring alone 
The results from Jämtland are particularly interesting since they are the only ones 
generated from one experiment testing two different service packages in one macro-
economic environment. So far we have found that both combining JSA and monitoring 
services, and monitoring alone, increase off-unemployment exits both to jobs and other 
activities. More interestingly, however, is that while the combined services generate 
positive effects on employment probability and earnings in the years following the 
programme, increased monitoring alone does not. 
A more detailed analysis shows that 87 (88) percent of those reportedly working in 
the  JSA+M  group in 2004 were also employed in 2005 (2006). The corresponding 
shares in the M-group and the control group were 83 (84) and 82 (84) respectively. 
Focusing on those not  employed in 2004, 47 (62) percent in JSA+M  group was 
employed in 2005 (2006) and 46 (64) percent in the control group. In the M-group the 
share was only 41 (55) percent. Both shorter employment spells among those employed 
in 2004, and lower job transitions among those not employed in 2004, thus seem to 
explain the worse results for the M-group. The results also provide some indications of 
the M-group performing worse than the control group where the unemployed received 
the regular services. The absence of active measures, besides increased surveillance, 
thus seems to have delayed unemployment exit for some unemployed. 
In the spring of 2005, surveys were performed in all of the demonstration but 
Uppsala. Experiment and control group members were asked questions about their job-
search behaviour (if unemployed) and employments (if employed). Table 10 reports 
some of the responses from the group reportedly working in Jämtland. Once again, the 
samples are small and the results should be carefully interpreted. 
I find that approximately 50 percent of the employed returned to a previous 
employer, a majority (60-70 %) got a job in the same profession as before, and 
approximately 70 percent got a temporary or hourly employment. 
The results indicate that the higher job exits in the treatment groups were the result of 
the participants more often returning to a previous employer and to their previous 32  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
profession. A difference between the treatment groups is that a larger share (68 % 
compared to 48 %) got a temporary employment in the M group. This corresponds to 
the lower share of employed in 2005 among those employed in 2004. Increased exits to 
temporary employments are positive if they increase the chances of receiving a 
permanent job. They could, however, also postpone the transitions to permanent 
employment. 
Table 10 Survey answers for unemployed leaving unemployment for jobs, percent 
  JSA+M  M  Control 
Employer       
   Same as before
a  48  52  41 
   Different/no answer  52  48  59 
       
Profession (compared to before)       
   Same/similar  70  66  62 
   Different  29  32  35 
   Other  1  2  3 
       
Type of employment       
   Permanent  36  27  33 
   Temporary  48  68  57 
   Hourly  16  4  9 
Note: 
a: Also includes earlier subsidised employment with the employer. No. of obs, pre-programme, JSA+M: 94, M: 95, control: 
181. 
 
10  Conclusions 
This paper reports the results from five pilot schemes performing intensified placement 
efforts on exposed groups of unemployed. The results are generally encouraging 
confirming the results from earlier research reporting positive effects from active place-
ment efforts. The small samples however create imprecise and often insignificant im-
pact estimates. 
All services reduced unemployment duration. Separating exits, I find significantly 
increased job exits in four of the experiments. In two of the experiments, both 
performed in Jämtland, both job-search assistance and monitoring combined, and 
monitoring alone, shortened the unemployment spells with almost seven weeks. The IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  33 
effects on employment probabilities and gross earnings in the years following the 
programme are also positive in general with significant impacts in three of the experi-
ments. 
Pooling data from all experiments and from the entire follow-up period (2-3 years), 
the services seem promising for different subgroups of unemployed except for youth. 
Interesting to note is that while the positive effects for typically exposed group (low 
educated and long-term unemployed) were found in terms of reduced unemployment 
duration, the positive impact for high educated and short-term unemployed was found in 
higher earnings. This suggests that the exposed groups to a higher extent transitioned to 
other activities than jobs. 
Interesting findings were reported comparing the effect of combining job-search 
assistance and monitoring, with monitoring alone, in Jämtland. Although both service 
packages significantly increased off-unemployment exits, only the combined services 
generated positive effects on employment probability and gross earnings in subsequent 
years. This implies that monitoring alone is not sufficient to produce positive effects in 
the long run. Survey data indicate that the increased job exits in the increased 
monitoring group were the result of more temporary employments. Also, both treatment 
packages increased short-term sickness absence. 
These results highlight the potential risk of active measures. By increasing the cost of 
remaining unemployed, the temporary exits from unemployment may increase. As a 
consequence, transitions to permanent employment may be postponed. The found 
increase in exits to the sickness insurance system also put focus on the interdependence 
between public social insurance systems and the importance of them jointly creating 
incentives for the unemployed to work. 34  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
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Appendix A 
Randomisation procedure 
As currently employed at the Swedish Labour Market Board (SLMB), the author of this 
paper was the responsible evaluator for the presented experiments. The randomisation 
process involved the following steps: 
 
1  The evaluator at the SLMB identifies and marks the specified target group in the 
public employment services (PES) internal information system. 
2  The project team workers in all experiments but Skellefteå review the personal 
acts of all marked candidates and eliminate those likely to have exited from 
unemployment in the near past, and those with an active labour market pro-
gramme about to start. This procedure could take a few days. 
3  The evaluator confirms current status in the unemployment register and performs 
randomisation using the “ranuni” function in SAS. Those randomised into the 
treatment group are marked in the PES internal information system. The initial 
marking is eliminated. 
4  Treatment group members are sent a letter or an e-mail saying that he/she is 
selected to participate in a mandatory activation programme at the PES. They are 
also reminded of the UI requirements. The control group members are not infor-
med of the demonstration services. Neither of  the groups is informed of the 
services being evaluated. IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden  37 
 
Table A1 a Yearly gross ernings from work (SEK 1000), 2004–2006 
  Jämtland  Uppsala 
  JSA+M  M  Control  Treated  Control 
2004  81.3  72.8  79.6          94.3            89.0 
2005  119.9  109.2  113.0    141.9     122.5 
2006  150.9  130.8  140.9  189.2  168.0 
  Östergötland              Skellefteå 
  Treated  Control  Treated  Control   
2004  50.8  52.9  79.8  64.4   
2005  77.8  80.4  116.0  96.4   
2006  117.0  114.2  143.0  131.5   
Notes: No. of obs., Jämtland 2004, JSA+M: 246,  M: 250, controls: 507. 2005, JSA+M: 246, M: 250, controls: 
503. 2006, JSA+M: 242, M: 247, controls: 503. Uppsala 2004, treated: 272, control: 239. 2005, treated: 267, 
controls: 237. 2006, treated: 264, controls: 236. Östergötland 2004, treated: 357, controls: 378 . 2005, treated: 355, 
controls: 377. 2006, treated: 353, controls: 376. Skellefteå 2004 and 2005, treated: 143, controls: 145.  2006, 
treated: 143, controls: 143. 
 
Table A1 b Employed (share), 2004–2006 
  Jämtland  Uppsala 
  JSA+M  M  Control  Treated  Control 
2004  0.52  0.46  0.44     0.57      0.52 
2005  0.67  0.60  0.62     0.71      0.62 
2006  0.76  0.68  0.73   0.80   0.76 
  Östergötland               Skellefteå 
  Treated  Control  Treated  Control   
2004  0.35  0.37  0.58  0.54   
2005  0.50  0.52  0.65  0.58   
2006  0.68  0.65  0.71  0.66   
Notes: No. of obs., Jämtland 2004, JSA+M: 246,  M: 250, controls: 507. 2005, JSA+M: 246, M: 250, controls: 
503. 2006, JSA+M: 242, M: 247, controls: 503. Uppsala 2004, treated: 272, control: 239. 2005, treated: 267, 
controls: 237. 2006, treated: 264, controls: 236. Östergötland 2004, treated: 357, controls: 378 . 2005, treated: 355, 
controls: 377. 2006, treated: 353, controls: 376. Skellefteå 2004 and 2005, treated: 143, controls: 145.  2006, 
treated: 143, controls: 143. 38  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
 
Table A1 c Number of unemployment weeks, 2004–2006 
  Jämtland  Uppsala 
  JSA+M  M  Control  Treated  Control 
2004  20.3  20.8  20.9    19.9          22.0 
2005  19.5  19.4  21.4    16.5    19.0 
2006  14.5  16.8  15.2  8.5         10.8 
  Östergötland               Skellefteå 
  Treated  Control  Treated  Control   
2004  18.6  19.5  17.6  18.5   
2005  22.2  21.8  16.3  18.2   
2006  14.5  13.8  11.8  11.0   
Notes: No. of obs., see Table 1. 
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Appendix B 
Table B 1 Adjusted impact estimates on unemployment 
duration (weeks), using a one-week interruption rule 
Demonstration  Impact estimate  
Jämtland   
     JSA+M  -4.2 [-9.9 - 1.5] 
     M  -4.6 [-10.3 - 1.1] 
Uppsala  -0.7 [-6.6 – 5.2] 
Östergötland  -0.9 [-5.8 – 4.0] 
Skellefteå  -2.8 [-7.1 - 1.5] 
Notes: Adjustments are made in a linear regression model including the covariates 
specified in Table 3. 95%-confidence intervals are within square brackets. *, **, *** 
refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
Table B 2 Adjusted programme, pre-programme, and participation impacts 
on the hazard ratio, using a one-week interruption rule 
  Jämtland 
  JSA+M  M 
Average programme effect  1.217 (0.083)**  1.133 (0.083) 
    Pre-programme effect         1.190 (0.141)  0.881 (0.153) 
Participation effect  1.227 (0.101)**    1.257 (0.098)** 
  Uppsala  Östergötland 
Average programme effect         1.064 (0.093)  1.079 (0.078) 
    Pre-programme effect         1.196 (0.227)  1.140 (0.189) 
Participation effect         1.041 (0.101)  1.068 (0.085) 
  Skellefteå   
Average programme effect         1.241 (0.123)*   
    Pre-programme effect  -   
Participation effect  -   
Notes: Estimations include the covariates specified in Table 3. Standard errors are within square brackets. *, **, 
*** refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 40  IFAU – Experimental evidence from intensified placement efforts among unemployed in Sweden 
 
Table B 3 adjusted impact estimates on the hazard ratio to jobs and 
other activities, using a one-week interruption rule 
  Job  Other 
Jämtland     
     JSA+M  1.374 (0.103)***  0.950 (0.144) 
     M  1.291 (0.105)**  0.907 (0.140) 
Uppsala  1.598 (0.129)***  0.679 (0.139)*** 
Östergötland  1.113 (0.104)  1.027 (0.120) 
Skellefteå  1.460 (0.162)**  0.990 (0.189) 
Notes: Estimations control for the covariates specified in Table 3. “Other” activities refer to exits to cause 
unknown, sickness absence, early retirement and regular training. Standard errors are within parentheses. 
*, **, *** refer to significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Publication series published by the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
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